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cause it is in the plural number and not in the singular, would be
pushing inference to a dangerous extent, and further than we are
disposed to carry it. The rule for a new trial is consequently dis-
charged, and judgment entered for the defendants, on the plea of




In our last number, we saw that in the law, as in inathematical
science, one common result may frequently be deduced by differ-
ent, independent processes of reasoning. Now we may furthei
observe, that as no tw6 correct mathematical processes will lead to
opposite or conflicting conclusions, so will no two legal ones. A
remembrance of this truth will always be of great service in testing
the correctness of proposed legal principles.
Thus, one- means by which we ascertain what is the law, is to coil-
sult that natural sense of right and justice which the Maker of us
all has placed in the human mind. If there is proposed to us a
legal principle, which we discover will legitimately lead to what the
common understanding of mankind deems unjust, we conclude that
the principle cannot and does not belong to the law. If, on the
other hand, it uniformly conducts to what is just, we at once decide
that it ought to be a part of our law, and set about seeing whether
it really is so.
Now to establish, not merely that it ought to be, but in fact is, a
principle of the law, we are not obliged to find any adjudication in
which the judges have mentioned it as such, or adopted a course of
argument from which we can infer so much as that it even occurred
to their minds. So, on the other hand, if a judge, in a case which
we know to have been correctly decided, has distinctly laid it down
as a principle of the law, that does not necessarily establish it as such,
though it may go far as evidence to our minds that it is. Courts
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do not decide principles, but cases. All that is strictly authority,
in a decision, is its legal conclusion, though it is in the highest
degree satisfactory and helpful to see the course of legal reasoning
by which the minds of the judges traveled to it. And if a conclu-
sion of law is correct, we are apt to infer that the principles, or
processes by which it was arrived at, are correct also; but there is
nothing in the nature of things which makes this necessarily so, nor
is it by any means uniformly so in fact. The good sense, or intui-
tive perceptions of a judge, may direct him to a right decision; but
when he undertakes to show his reasons for it, he may be in fault
at every step.
Yet if we suppose that all the cases in the books were correctly
decided, on sound legal reasoning, still, as different processes from
those employed might have brought out equally well the same
results, it follows that the legal principles, which these different
processestwould have developed, are just as much principles of the
law as if the development of them had actually been made. Sup-
pose, then, a proposition is presented to us, and we wish to deter-
mine whether it is a principle of our law. Suppose we find, on
examination, that it has never been recognized in any of the cases;
but suppose we further find, that it will uniformly lead to conclu-
sions which commend themselves as just, and, on bringing it to the
test of the cases, find also that wherever it is applicable to the facts
it leads to the same results which the judges arrived at by other
processes of reasoning. Can any one deny that such a proposition
is actually a principle of the law? It has in its favor all that any
principle has; it conforms to abstract justice, and to the cases,
which it harmonizes. Surely the fact, that no judge has happened
to observe or mention it, cannot affect the question.
It is not only theoretically, but practically, important to under-
stand that the courts adjudicate not principles, but cases. A fail-
ure to apprehend and appreciate this truth, has led to much embar-
rassment and confusion. When a judge has made up his mind how
to decide a case, he arranges his reasons for the decision. In order
to make his position look as strong as possible-judges being only
men-he brings to its support such arguments as he can. Of these
